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Abstract
We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities
of uncertainty that di¤er in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from
the opposite market side and initially know the ‘name’ but not the
‘type’ of the other players. Learning occurs via matching and using
Bayes’rule. We introduce the notion of a stable and consistent outcome, and show how the interaction between blocking and learning
behavior shapes the existence of paths to stability in each of the uncertainty environments. Existence of stable and consistent outcomes
then follows as a side result.
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A second marriage is the triumph of hope over experience.
Samuel Johnson

1

Introduction

Since the seminal contribution of Gale and Shapley (1962) economists have
predominantly analyzed centralized mechanisms to derive equilibrium outcomes in two-sided markets. The question whether such outcomes can be
reached in a decentralized manner has taken a second stage although, one
may argue, the decentralized markets outnumber those with a centralized
mechanism in place. To the best of our knowledge the only authors to address this question are Roth and Vande Vate (1990), Diamantoudi et al.
(2004), and Chen et al. (2011). In all of these works, however, it is assumed
that players on both sides of the market have complete information about
the type of the agents on the other market side.
In the present paper we re-visit the question on whether an equilibrium
outcome in the standard one-to-one two-sided market model can be reached
in a decentralized manner when we assume away complete information. We
discuss instead two worlds of uncertainty that di¤er in terms of the process
that assigns types to market players. Here market participants have preferences over the types of the agents with whom they can be matched but not
over their identities. In our analysis information requirements are kept to
the minimum, that is, players only know their own type and type is independent of individual preferences. Thus, two agents of the same type may
have di¤erent preferences. This constitutes also a crucial di¤erence between
our work and Liu at al. (2012), apart from the fact that we focus on the
existence of paths leading to stable and consistent outcomes (consisting of a
matching and a corresponding system of beliefs) in this framework.
2
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More precisely, we show that when the number of types equals the number of agents and types are assigned as random independent draws from the
set of types without replacement (one-to-one uncertainty), then any stable
matching under complete information is part of a stable and consistent outcome of the corresponding matching problem with one-to-one uncertainty
(Section 3.1). Consistency is shown in this case by the existence of a path
containing a multiple of three steps of a particular form. On the other hand,
when the number of types is at most equal to the number of corresponding
agents and types are assigned to agents as random independent draws from
the set of types with replacement (many-to-one uncertainty), we show that,
starting from an arbitrary self-consistent outcome, there exists a path to a
stable and consistent outcome for any matching problem with many-to-one
uncertainty (Section 3.2). The construction of a path in this case is shaped
by the interaction between blocking and learning behavior and uses, for some
of its parts, Roth and Vande Vate’s (1990) algorithm for reaching a stable
matching in environments with complete information.

2

Setup

We consider two …nite sets M and W of agents, called “men”and “women”,
respectively. Agents can be of di¤erent types. We denote the …nite set
of all possible male types by
types by

W

. The functions

M
M

and the …nite set of all possible female

:M !

M

and

W

:W !

W

assign a

type to each man and woman, respectively. Male’s preferences are de…ned
over all possible female types and the possibility of remaining single, and
are assumed to be complete, transitive and antisymmetric. Correspondingly,
female’s strict preferences are de…ned over all possible male types and the
3
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possibility of remaining single. A pro…le of such preferences is denoted by
i )i2M [W .

= (

When the assignment of types is known, agents can use

their preferences over types to derive preferences over individuals on the
other side of the market. Notice, however, that strict preferences over types
do not imply strict preferences over agents as some agents can be of the same
type.
Initially individuals know their own type (and thus, the “type” of the
possibility of remaining single) and only the ‘name’of all other individuals
from the opposite market side but not their types. We assume, instead, that
all agents have a common prior about the distribution of types among players.
Notice that it is not necessary for an agent to have any information about the
distribution of types among agents on their own side of the market. Thus,
priors can be women and men speci…c, and we denote them by

W

and

M

,

respectively. A one-to-one matching problem with uncertainty is a collection
of data consisting of two …nite sets of agents, the corresponding …nite sets of
types, assignment functions, priors, as well as a preference pro…le over types.
In the process of matching, agents learn the type of their partners and
can use Bayes’rule to update their priors on the type of agents on the other
side of the market with whom they have not been matched. Therefore, we
de…ne an outcome of the matching problem under uncertainty as a pair ( ; )
consisting of a matching function
function
and

2

and a system of beliefs

. The matching

: M [ W ! M [ W is such that (i) 2 W [ f;g, (j) 2 M [ f;g,

(k) = k hold for all i 2 M , all j 2 W , and all k 2 M [ W . The

interpretation of (k) = ; for some k 2 M [ W is that the corresponding
agent is single under . The system of beliefs

contains all agents’beliefs

about the type of each agent on the opposite side of the market. In particular,
we use the notation

i (j; t)

to denote the belief agent i holds about j being
4
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of type t.
Using the system of beliefs, we can de…ne a blocking pair for an outcome
( ; ). A pair of agents (m; w) with m 2 M and w 2 W is blocking the
W

outcome ( ; ) if there are a female type t1 2

and a male type t2 2

M

such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) t1
(2)

m

m

W

( (m)) and t2

(w; t1 ) > 0 and

w

w

M

( (w));

(m; t2 ) > 0.

Thus we require that each member of a blocking pair assigns positive
probability to the fact that the other pair member is of a type ranked higher
than the type of his or her current match. Note that the possibility of an
agent blocking unilaterally the matching

is also captured in the above

formulation.
Certainly, the beliefs that an agent holds evolve with the search of an optimal partner, thus they cannot be just any believes but should be consistent
with the individual agent’s history. We call a system of beliefs
with respect to a matching

(denoted by

consistent

) if the following conditions are

j

met:
(1) for all m 2 M with (m) 6= ;,
0 for all t 2

W

nf

W

m(

( (m))g, and

m (w; t)

for all w 2 W n f (m)g and all t 2

W

(2) for all w 2 W with (w) 6= ;,

(w);

0 for all t 2

M

nf

M

w(

( (w))g, and

for all m 2 M n f (w)g and all t 2
(3) for all m 2 M with (m) = ;,
t2

W

W

(m);

= P rob(

W

m(

(w) = t j

(m); t) =

W

( (m)))

.
M

w (m; t)
M

( (m))) = 1 and

( (w))) = 1 and

= P rob(

M

w(

(m) = t j

(w); t) =
M

( (w)))

.

m (w; t)

=

W

(t) for all w 2 W and all

.

5
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(4) for all w 2 W with (w) = ;,
M

t2

w (m; t)

M

=

(t) for all m 2 M and all

.

Here the consistency of the system of beliefs with respect to a matching
requires …rst, that each agent knows the type of his or her partner in this
matching; and second, that agents’beliefs about the type of all other agents
with whom they are not matched are updated using Bayes’ rule. Notice
in addition that agents staying single in the matching do not update their
beliefs, i.e., their beliefs about the type of all agents on the opposite market
side are given by the corresponding common priors. The outcome

;

is

j

called self-consistent.
Next, we de…ne the consistency of an outcome with respect to a given
history of matchings. We will consider an outcome ( ; ) to be consistent
with respect to a self-consistent initial outcome ( 0 ;
quence of outcomes
and

k;

1 ;:::; k

j

1;

j

1

;:::;

k;

j

`

with

1 ;:::; k

`;

j

(2.2)

m`

w` ;

(2.3)

m`

W

M

(w; t)j

(w` )

j

(m` );

j

1 ;:::; `

1 ;:::; `+1

1 ;:::; `+1

nf

M

j

0

)

1:

such that

`+1

is ob-

1 ;:::; `+1

j

such that for

=

w`

m` ;

M

W

nf

= 0 for all t 2

(m` )
W

j

1 ;:::; `+1

(w` )g and

= 1;
w`

(m` ; t))j

1 ;:::; `+1

=

(m` )g;

1 ;:::; `+1

W n fw` g and all t 2
M

= ( 0;

1

1:

(w` ; t))j

0 for all t 2

j

by satisfying (m` ; w` );

all ` = 1; : : : ; k
m`

) if there is a se-

1;

1 ;:::; `

(2) there is a consistent Bayesian updating of beliefs

(2.1)

0

= ( ; ) such that for all ` = 1; : : : ; k

(1) there is a blocking pair (m` ; w` ) for
tained from

j

= P rob(
W

, and

W

(w) = t j
w`

(m; t)j

W

(w` );

1 ;:::; `+1

) for all m 2 M n fm` g and all t 2

j

1 ;:::; `

= P rob(
M

) for all w 2
M

(m) = t j

;

6
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(2.4)
and

m (w; t)j
w (m; t)j

1 ;:::; `+1
1 ;:::; `+1

=
=

m (w; t)j
w (m; t)j

1 ;:::; `
1 ;:::; `

for all m 2 M nfm` g and all t 2
for all w 2 W n fw` g and all t 2

W

,

M

.

Clearly, condition (1) above de…nes a ‘legitimate’ path of search for an
optimal partner. We take an outcome to be consistent with respect to an initial self-consistent outcome if it can be derived from it by satisfying blocking
pairs. Condition (2), on the other hand, describes a sound ‘learning process’,
i.e., the updating of beliefs along the path of blocked matchings. We require
here that all agents who are matched to each other know their true type; these
agents use Bayesian updating to re-calculate the probability with which any
other agent on the opposite side of the market is of any given type; and last,
agents who do not participate in a blocking pair do not update their beliefs
as they do not gain any additional information.
Using the above de…nitions, we can de…ne an outcome ( ; ) to be consistent if there exists an initial self-consistent outcome ( 0 ;

j

0

) with respect

to which it is consistent. An outcome ( ; ) is stable if there are no blocking
pairs for it. In what follows we will focus on outcomes which are both stable
and consistent.

3

World of uncertainty

We will discuss two di¤erent mechanisms that map agents to types. In the
…rst one learning the type of one agent will be informative about the probability with which all other agents on the opposite side of the market are of
a particular type, while for the second mechanism this will not be the case.
Hence in the second case learning will be slower. In each of these cases we
will discuss the relation between the set of stable and consistent outcomes
under uncertainty and the set of stable outcomes under complete informa7
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tion. We will also ask the question whether there is a path reaching a stable
and consistent outcome starting from any initial self-consistent outcome.
To answer the former question, we need to recall here the standard de…nition of a matching problem, how it is related to a matching problem under
uncertainty, and what constitutes a stable outcome under complete information. A one-to-one matching problem with complete information is a tuple
(M; W;
and

0

0

), where M and W are the sets of men and women as de…ned above

denotes a preference pro…le that collects the preferences that men and

women hold over their potential partners in a matching. Given a matching
problem under uncertainty as de…ned above, we say that the matching problem with complete information (M; W;

0

) corresponds to it if the sets of

agents coincide and the preference pro…les are such that for all agents they
induce the same ranking of potential partners. That is, for m 2 M and
0
m

wi ; wj 2 W , wi

w 2 W and mi ; mj 2 M , mi
matching

0
w

(wi )

m

W

mj if and only if

(wj ), and similarly, for
M

(mi )

M

w

(mj ). A

is stable under complete information if there does not exist a

pair (m; w) of agents such that w

3.1

W

wj if and only if

0
m

(m) and m

0
w

(w).

One-to-one uncertainty

Consider a situation in which the number of male and female types equals the
number of men and women, respectively, and types are assigned as random
independent draws from the set of corresponding types without replacement,
i.e., there is a one-to-one mapping between identities and types (

M

and

W

are bijections). Thus, the prior belief that each man holds about the type
of any woman is given by
for all t 2

M

W

(t) =

1
jW j

for all t 2

W

, and

M

(t) =

1
jM j

is the prior probability that any man is of any given type.

8
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Here knowing the type of one partner is informative about what types other
potential partners may be, and more importantly, the probability with which
other potential partners are ranked higher than the current one. Moreover,
as agents are endowed with strict preferences over types, it implies that their
corresponding preferences over potential partners are also strict. We will
refer to this case as one-to-one uncertainty.
The existence of stable and consistent outcomes in this case is a direct
corollary of our …rst result.
Theorem 1 Let a matching problem under one-to-one uncertainty be given
and ( ; ) be an outcome of it. Then ( ; ) is stable and consistent if and
only if

is stable for the corresponding matching problem under complete

information.
Proof. First we show that any matching which is part of a stable and consistent outcome under one-to-one uncertainty is also a stable matching under
complete information. Consider a stable and consistent outcome ( ; ) under
one-to-one uncertainty, and suppose that
ing matching problem (M; W;

0

is not stable for the correspond-

) under complete information. Therefore,

there exists a pair (m; w) of agents who are not matched to each other under
and prefer to be matched to each other than to their current partners:
w
M

0
m

(m) and m

(m)

w

M

(w). This implies that

W

(w)

m

W

( (m)) and

( (w)). Given the consistency of agents’beliefs and

M

for all t 2

0
w

and

W

(t) > 0 for all t 2

W

M

(t) > 0

, it must be that both m and

w hold strictly positive beliefs that the other agent is of their true type, i.e.,
w (m;

M

and t2 =

(m)) > 0 and
M

m (w;

W

(w)) > 0. Therefore, by setting t1 =

W

(w)

(m), (m; w) is a blocking pair for the outcome ( ; ) under one-

to-one uncertainty, too. Thus, we have established a contradiction.
Let us now consider the matching problem (M; W;

0

) under complete in-

9
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formation and let

be a stable matching for this problem. We will show that

there is a consistent outcome ( ; ) of the corresponding problem under oneto-one uncertainty which is also stable. Consider the initial self-consistent
outcome ( ;

). If there are no blocking pairs in ( ;

j

j

), then we have

shown what we need. Notice further that it is impossible for an agent to
block ( ;

j

) unilaterally as

is stable under complete information and thus,

individually rational. Suppose now that there is a pair (m; w) that blocks
( ;

j

such that (1) t1
and

m

j ;

then either (m)
( (w))

M

w

W

( (m)) and

m (w; t1 )j

and a male type t2 2

> 0, and (2) t2

M

w

M

( (w))

> 0. It follows then that we can construct the consistent

w (m; t2 )j

outcome ( 1 ;
M

W

). That is, there are a female type t1 2

1

). This cannot be a stable outcome: since
0
m

w and thus,

W

( (m))

m

W

(w), or (w)

is stable,
0
w

m, thus

(m). Suppose it is m who forms a blocking pair (m; (m))

with his partner in . By satisfying this blocking pair we can construct the
consistent outcome ( 2 ;

j ;

1; 2

). This consistent outcome cannot be stable

either as w forms a blocking pair ( (w); w) with her partner in , the reason being that

is individually rational and preferences in both matching

problems (with one-to-one uncertainty and with complete information) are
strict. By satisfying this blocking pair we construct the consistent outcome
( 3;

j ;

1; 2; 3

), where by construction

3

=

and

Consider …nally the consistent outcome ( ;

j ;

j ;

1; 2; 3

1; 2;

=

j ;

1

.

). The pair (m; w)

cannot block this matching because in the process of beliefs’ updating m
has learned the type of w and knows that he prefers to be with his partner
in

than to be with w. If there is no blocking pair, then this is a stable

outcome and we have shown what we need. If there is a blocking pair, then
this pair was also blocking the initial self-consistent outcome ( ;

j

). Then,

using the same logical steps as above, we can construct a path by satisfying
10
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the blocking pairs that will lead to a consistent outcome in a multiple of
three steps that comprises of

and a system of beliefs in which exactly four

agents (two men and two women) use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs
in a consistent manner. The process will continue in a multiple of three
steps along the path until all agents who form blocking pairs in ( ;
learned the type of their partners in the blocking pair. Since

j

) have

is stable under

complete information, at least one of the partners in these blocking pairs will
prefer her or his partner in

to the one with whom they formed a blocking

pair under one-to-one uncertainty. Thus, we can always go back to . Due
to the …niteness of the sets M and W , this path will terminate in a …nite
number of steps with a stable and consistent outcome that contains .
Given the existence result of Gale and Shapley (1962) for stable outcomes
in the standard one-to-one matching problem, it is easy to establish the nonemptiness of the set of stable and consistent outcome under one-to-one type
of uncertainty as a corollary of the above result.
Corollary 1 The set of stable and consistent outcomes for any matching
problem under one-to-one uncertainty is non-empty.

3.2

Many-to-one uncertainty

Consider a situation in which the number of types is at most equal to the
number of the corresponding agents (men and women), and types are assigned to agents as random independent draws from the set of types with
replacement (i.e.,
t 2

M

W

(t) =

1
j

Wj

for all t 2

). Since the assignment functions

W
M

and

and

W

M

(t) =

1
j

Mj

for all

may not be one-to-

one or onto and thus, many agents can be assigned the same type, we have
that agents’preferences over potential partners can contain indi¤erences even
11
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though their preferences over types are strict. We refer to this case as manyto-one uncertainty.
Here knowing the type of one partner is not informative about the types
of the other agents on the opposite market side, and more importantly, the
probability with which (the type of) the other potential partners are ranked
higher than (the type of) the current one. Consequently, agents will continue
‘learning’ by blocking any matching in which they do not have complete
information unless they are matched to an agent of their most preferred
type. This observation will be in the core of the proof of our next result.
Theorem 2 Let a matching problem under many-to-one uncertainty be given
and ( 0 ;

j

0

) be a self-consistent outcome of it. Then the matching problem

has a stable outcome which is consistent with respect to ( 0 ;

j

0

).

Proof. The proof will be constructive. Let us collect in the set B(0) all
agents who form blocking pairs for ( 0 ;

j

0

) such that the corresponding pair

members know each other, and let L(0) be the analogous set in which the
members of a blocking pair do not know each other, i.e., there is a possibility
of learning. We can then de…ne the set S(0) = ffm; wg
B(0)g :

0 (m)

= w,

w (mi ;

M

(mi )) < 1 and

m (wj ;

W

(M [ W ) n fL(0) [
(wj )) < 1 for some

mi ; wj 2 B(0) [ L(0)g consisting of all married agents under

0

who will not

form a blocking pair in any subsequent matching because the fact that they
do not form a blocking pair for ( 0 ;

j

0

) with the possibility for learning with

someone from B(0) or L(0) implies that these agents are matched to partners
of their most preferred type. If there is no blocking pair at all for ( 0 ;
we are done. Given the self-consistency of ( 0 ;
if there is a blocking pair for ( 0 ;

j

0

j

0

j

0

),

), we have B(0) = ;. So,

), then it must contain agents only from

L(0).
In this case we can construct a sequence of consistent outcomes ( 0 ;

j

0

),

12
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( 1;

j

0; 1

), ; : : :, (

k;

j

0 ; 1 ;:::; k

) along which individuals can learn the type

of the agents on the opposite side of the market by forming blocking pairs
only with such agents with whom they have not been matched before. Here
k is the smallest integer for which L(k) = ;, i.e., there is no possibility for
learning. Consider the consistent outcome (

k;

j

0 ; 1 ;:::; k

) and note that if

B(k) = ;, then we are done. If, however, B(k) 6= ;, then all men (women) in
B(k) must know the type of all women (men) in B(k), otherwise they could
form a blocking pair with learning in contradiction to L(k) = ;.
If B(k) = (M [ W ) n S(k), then we can use the algorithm of Roth and
Vande Vate (1990) to construct a stable matching of agents in B(k). This
will lead to a stable and consistent outcome in which the agents in S(k) will
be matched according to

k,

agents in B(k) will be matched according to

Roth and Vande Vate’s (1990) algorithm for reaching a stable matching, and
the beliefs along the path will equal

j

0 ; 1 ;:::; k

, i.e., there will be no further

updating of beliefs because only agents who know each other’s type will be
matched. In case B(k) 6= (M [ W ) n S(k), we can pick up at random one of
wk ’s most preferred partners in B(k), say mk , and construct the consistent
outcome (
setting

j

k+1 ;

j

0 ; 1 ;:::; k+1

0 ; 1 ;:::; k+1

=

j

) by satisfying the blocking pair (mk ; wk ) and

0 ; 1 ;:::; k

. Set A(k + 1) = fmk ; wk g to be the set

of satis…ed blocking pairs where agents knew each other’s type prior to this
matching.
If L(k + 1) = ; and B(k + 1) = ;, then we are done. If L(k + 1) 6= ;,
however, then construct

k+2

by satisfying a blocking pair in L(k + 1) and

update the beliefs in a consistent manner. Set A(k + 2) = ;. Notice that
L(q) = ; in some …nite steps q due to the …niteness of the sets M and
W , i.e., men and women will eventually learn the types of all agents on
the opposite side of the market. And if L(k + 1) = ;, but B(k + 1) 6= ;,
13
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then it must be that all agents in B(k + 1) and A(k + 1) know each other’s
type otherwise they would have formed a blocking pair with learning in
or

k+1 .

k

Also notice that wk 2
= B(k + 1) because mk is one of wk ’s most

preferred partners and she cannot form any new blocking pairs in
she could not form in

k.

j

that

Then pick a blocking pair at random from the set

B(k + 1), say (wk+1 ; mk+1 ) and form the matching
blocking pair. Let

k+1

0 ; 1 ;:::; k+2

=

0 ; 1 ;:::; k+1

j

=

A(k + 1) [ fmk+1 ; wk+1 g and note that A(k + 1)

j

k+2

by satisfying this

0 ; 1 ;:::; k

. Set A(k + 2) =

A(k + 2).

Thus, if there is no subsequent step r with L(r) 6= ; (i.e., there are no
possibilities for learning any more), we can adopt Roth and Vande Vate’s
(1990) algorithm to construct an increasing sequence of sets that contain no
blocking pairs until a stable matching is found. This is possible because,
as argued above, in any outcome in which all agents who form a blocking
pair know each other’s type, they must also know the type of any other
agent on the opposite side of the market who forms a blocking pair; and
they either know the type of the agents in the set A(r) with whom they do
not form a blocking pair, or those agents in A(r) whose type they do not
know are also in S(r) and thus they are matched to partners of their most
preferred type. Since only blocking pairs with no learning are satis…ed along
the path following

k

and reaching a stable matching, we construct a stable

and consistent outcome that consists of the stable matching just obtained
and the system of beliefs

j

0 ; 1 ;:::; k

.

An immediate corollary of Theorem 2 is the existence of a stable and
consistent outcome in this set up.
Corollary 2 The set of stable and consistent outcomes for any matching
problem under many-to-one uncertainty is non-empty.
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It is also straightforward to show the following relation to the set of stable
matchings in the corresponding complete information problem.
Proposition 1 Let a matching problem under many-to-one uncertainty be
given and ( ; ) be a stable and consistent outcome of it. Then

is stable

for the corresponding matching problem with complete information.
The proof of Proposition 1 is analogous to the …rst part of the proof of
Theorem 1.

4

Conclusion

In this work we embed the standard one-to-one matching problem in an
environment of uncertainty. We show that with very little information requirements we can replicate standard results from the theory under complete
information. Thus, one may argue assuming complete information in the …rst
place has not been a limitation. On the other hand, developing a methodology for the analysis of two-sided matching problems under uncertainty opens
the door for further investigation into the role of memory, speed of learning,
and appropriate institutions that could facilitate the search along a path to
stability.
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